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The American peace move-
ment in the two decades be-
fore the First World War grew 
rapidly in terms of the pro-
liferation of peace societies, 
active membership and finan-
cial backing. From a tiny 
nucleus consisting of the 
American Peace Society and 
Universal Peace Union, both 
of which began long before 
1898, peace work became a 
popular avocation in the first 
years of the twentieth century. 
Annual meetings on interna-
tional arbitration at Albert 
Smiley's hotel resort on Lake 
Mohonk, New York, begun 
in 1895, were consistently at-
tended by almost all the lead-
ing friends of international 
peace after about 1900; and 
beginning in 1907 many 
peace leaders organized bien-
nial peace conferences in vari-
ous American cities. In the 
decade before the outbreak 
of the European war advo-
cates of peace also created 
many new peace and inter-
nationalist societies, most not-
ably the American Society of 
International Law, the New 
York Peace Society, the 
Now, my friends, in conclusion, the Peace 
Movement is no longer a little cult of cranks. 
Peace has at last become a practical political 
issue—soon the political issue before all the 
nations . . . . 
It seems destined that America should lead 
in this movement. The U.S. is the world in 
miniature. The U.S. is a demonstration that 
all the peoples of the world can live in peace 
under one form of government and its chief 
value to civilization is the disclosure of what 
this form of government is . . . and when that 
golden period is at hand—and it cannot be 
very far distant—we shall have in very truth 
Tennyson's dream of "The Parliament of 
Man, The Federation of the World, and for 
the first time since the Prince of Peace died 
on Calvary, we shall have Peace on Earth 
and Good Will to Men." 
Hamilton Holt, The Federation 
of the World, unpublished man-
uscript, [1907-1914] Hamilton 
Holt Papers, Mills Memorial 
Library, Rollins College 
It is the prophets and leaders who make 
the changes of the world. The talk of vox 
populi is often more of a delusion than a 
reality. Let us make enough of preachers, 
teachers, editors, and particularly statesmen 
to see the reasonableness and inevitableness 
of the new order, and it can be at once 
established and the great changes made. 
Frederick Lynch, The Peace Prob-
lem: The Task of the Twentieth 
Century (New York, 1911), 111 
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American School Peace League, the Chicago Peace Society, the American 
Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes and three en-
dowed institutions, the World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace and the Church Peace Union. In this 
decade alone American friends of world peace established more than 
forty-five peace societies, and after 1911 the Carnegie Endowment pro-
vided the American Peace Society with an annual subvention from 
which it supported its affiliated peace organizations. 
Yet when the European war erupted in 1914, almost all peace groups 
either remained aloof from the immediate issues of American neutrality 
or were too divided to influence the foreign policies of the Wilson ad-
ministration. As a result, some of the more active peace workers, dis-
satisfied with the existing peace groups, cooperated with like-minded 
newcomers to the movement in forming still other peace organizations 
to deal with the pressing problems arising out of the World War.1 
Beneath the usual descriptions of the peace movement lie some im-
portant unanswered questions. Only a few historians have attempted 
more than a partial survey of the leadership of the peace movement for 
the years 1898 to 1914; even less have they analyzed its common and dis-
tinctive features. To what degree is it possible to generalize about these 
peace workers as a group? And since the growing popularity of the peace 
cause inevitably added to the variety of temperaments and programs in 
the movement, exactly what were their differences? Finally, what were 
the internal weaknesses of the movement which accounted for its im-
potence and eventual reorganization after 1914? 
The answers require analysis of the backgrounds and assumptions of 
the thirty-six leaders who set the tone of the American peace movement 
between 1898 and 1914.2 Such analysis will show that although the 
leaders of the peace movement were remarkably similar in social back-
grounds and shared certain fundamental values, the movement failed to 
sustain its growing influence after the outbreak of the European war for 
two major reasons. First, the many divergent approaches to peace ques-
tions which existed in subdued fashion during peacetime surfaced under 
the pressures of a war-torn world and greatly accentuated the internal 
divisions in the movement. Second, despite the growing public interest 
in the peace movement, the strong elitism of the pre-war leadership 
which frustrated efforts to cultivate a mass following before the war 
facilitated the dissolution of the superficial support of the peace leaders 
after 1914. 
II 
It is not surprising to find considerable diversity in such a large group 
of peace leaders. Consider their ages. In 1909 when the movement was 
maturing, the age span ranged from the eighty-seven year old Boston 
minister, Edward Everett Hale, to the youthful student enthusiast at the 
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University of Wisconsin, Louis Lochner, only twenty-two; and there were 
representatives of all age groups between these extremes. Nor can it be 
said that the age of a peace worker had any direct relationship to his 
position on peace questions. About the most that can be said is that in 
1909 the average and median age of the peace leadership, both between 
fifty-four and fifty-five, was older than the leadership of the domestic 
reform movements of that day. 
More revealing than their ages was their length of service in the peace 
movement. Almost all of the peace leaders who had shown interest in 
the peace or anti-imperialist movements before 1900 were distinctly 
pacific-minded in their abhorrence of international violence. They also 
were more sympathetic to domestic reform movements than the later 
participants, most of whom tended to be conservative on domestic mat-
ters, more cautious or "practical" in their promotion of international 
reform, and more deferential toward political authority.3 Of the pre-1900 
recruits, few besides the Quakers—Alfred Love, head of the Universal 
Peace Union; Benjamin Trueblood, secretary of the American Peace 
Society and editor of its journal, Advocate of Peace; and William I. Hull, 
history professor at Swarthmore College—can be considered absolute 
pacifists in the sense that they refused to sanction any given war. But 
America's war with Spain and the imperialistic aftermath deeply dis-
turbed almost all of them. If they had not been full-fledged members of 
the American peace movement before 1898, they actively cooperated with 
peace workers in the anti-imperialist movement and moved effortlessly 
into the peace movement once the anti-imperialist agitation subsided. 
For them the peace movement became in part the proper instrument for 
organizing American opinion against possible future imperialist ventures 
and against navalism which dominated American thinking on foreign 
affairs at the turn of the century. They opposed the use of American 
military force in other lands but, unlike many isolationists who shunned 
America's participation in world affairs, these peace workers actively 
urged their government's participation in movements for permanent 
peace. Responding to the reality of America's emergence as a major 
world power, they advocated treaties of international arbitration, media-
tion and conciliation procedures and a broad educational campaign as 
rational alternatives to international conflict. A few even developed 
general proposals for world organization. Because they all espoused 
pacifism or inclined in that direction and worked for international co-
operation, they might best be called pacific-minded internationalists.4 
By contrast, of the post-1900 recruits only four of the youngest— 
Congregationalist minister and editor of Christian Work, Frederick 
Lynch; editor of the Independent, Hamilton Holt; and the two college 
student leaders of the Cosmopolitan Club, an international friendship 
society, George Nasmyth and Louis Lochner—flirted with absolute 
pacifism, and they affirmed their love of peace more on emotional than 
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on philosophical or religious grounds. Unlike those who had earlier en-
tered the peace movement, nearly all these latecomers had fewer regrets 
concerning their nation's navalism and imperialism. They accepted 
America's rise to world power as largely inevitable and essentially béné-
ficient, and they viewed the peace movement as the most useful vehicle 
for convincing American governmental leaders to promote a harmonious 
international order. 
In terms of their peace ideas, these post-1900 additions to the peace 
movement fall roughly into three groups: generalists, world federationists 
and legalists. Fannie Fern Andrews, organizer of the American School 
Peace League; the Chicago clergyman, Charles Beals; Arthur Deerin Call, 
officer of the Connecticut Peace Society and American Peace Society; 
Samuel Train Dutton, head of Teacher's College at Columbia University; 
the Reverend William Short, secretary of the New York Peace Society; 
Lynch, Nasmyth, and Lochner most often advanced extremely broad and 
general proposals for the promotion of world peace. These generalists 
shared the positive goals of the earlier recruits in urging their govern-
ment to promote international good will in its foreign policies. While 
they occasionally talked about the need for international organization, 
they rarely detailed its functions.5 
The world federationists were more clearly internationalists. These 
internationalists shared the peaceful aspirations of the pacific-minded 
and generalists, but were unwilling to wait for the conversion of the 
masses to the goal of world peace or of the nations' widespread acceptance 
of arbitration and conciliation procedures for the resolution of in-
ternational disputes. They wanted the major world powers to establish 
permanent international institutions which would formalize and regu-
larize the conciliation process. They talked most often of the creation 
of some kind of world federation. Their proposals ranged from Andrew 
Carnegie's general program for a league of peace composed of the lead-
ers of the major powers of Europe and the United States, who would 
agree to use economic sanctions and as a last resort an international 
police force against aggressor states, to more specific arrangements for 
the creation of an international legislature which would develop pro-
cedures for preserving the peace. Hamilton Holt, Richard Bartholdt, 
a Republican congressman from St. Louis, Missouri, and Raymond 
Bridgman, journalist and author, also urged the establishment of an 
international executive to apply the legislature's decisions to specific 
controversies.6 
The third group composed of Nicholas Murray Butler, president of 
Columbia University; George Kirchwey, professor of international law 
at Columbia; James Brown Scott, international lawyer and frequent ad-
viser to the State Department; and Elihu Root, Roosevelt's second Sec-
retary of State and later Senator from New York, emphasized interna-
tional law. Its members also were internationalists but they promoted 
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only the creation of a world court. They were primarily legalists who 
argued that international congresses, like the two Hague Peace Con-
ferences, could gradually formulate a code of international law, which 
justices of a world court could apply and further develop in their 
decisions between disputants. 
With so many individuals involved in the peace movement, it is not 
surprising that there were numerous approaches to the peace question. 
Indeed, the differences among the peace workers were in some respects 
fundamental. Those individuals who inclined toward pacifism chal-
lenged reliance on armaments; but the other leaders soft-pedalled the 
armament question and in a few instances readily tolerated the large navy 
boosters in the Navy League.7 
In addition, the legalists questioned other peace workers' faith in 
arbitration treaties. In their view the arbitral process might settle many 
controversies, but it was no panacea and contained inherent weaknesses. 
They pointed out that men trained in politics and diplomacy rather than 
well-known jurists almost always decided arbitration cases. The art of 
negotiation and the spirit of compromise rather than any higher concept 
of abstract justice were the guiding principles in these arbitrations. Com-
promise was also common in arbitration because of the need to har-
monize different or fragmentary concepts of international law. The 
legalists wanted to purge the procedures of international conciliation 
of their haphazard, arbitral features by creating a judicial court com-
posed of renowned judges, appointed for life and sitting in continuous 
session, who would rule on the "rights" of countries in accordance with 
the "facts" and the established law. In their view, only the correct ap-
plication, of accepted international law could bring true international 
justice, a prerequisite for any stable world order.8 
Tensions also existed between the legalists and the world federation-
ists. Less confident in the wisdom of nation states to decide the rules of 
right conduct, the former branded schemes for an international legisla-
ture and executive as too radical. Such authoritative institutions, they 
pointed out, involved the surrender of national sovereignty, which na-
tions were not yet prepared to accept. They also claimed that even if a 
world federation became a political reality, its use of force to preserve 
the peace would probably result in oppressive and unjust actions. For 
the legalists only renowned judges were impartial and the only acceptable 
sanction for their decisions was the very gradual development of "a 
world-wide public opinion" properly educated in the rights and duties 
of nations in the international community.9 
Differences even developed within each group. Among the world 
federationists, for example, Hamilton Holt at times favored the establish-
ment of some kind of international police force, but Raymond Bridg-
man was much more skeptical of any kind of sanctions.10 So, too, al-
though most of the pacific-minded members feared the possible harmful 
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consequences of an international police force, three of the strongest 
opponents of national armaments—Lucia Ames Mead, Boston intel-
lectual; Edwin Ginn, a text-book publisher; and William I. H u l l -
cautiously endorsed the creation of a small international police agency 
with limited powers to enforce the peace.11 Furthermore, Jane Addams 
was developing a peculiar brand of pacifism which had little in common 
with that of other pacifists. Much as she wrote about peace, moreover, 
she often seemed more interested in domestic than international re-
form. This was suggested when in the presidential election of 1912 she 
supported Theodore Roosevelt, certainly no friend of the peace move-
ment.12 
Temperamental and tactical differences also threatened the fragile 
unity of the movement. William Jennings Bryan's erratic opposition to 
imperialism, his alleged radicalism and political partisanship, his flam-
boyant rhetoric and his deliberate avoidance of membership in peace 
organizations embarrassed or annoyed some peace advocates.13 More-
over, Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn were jealous of their reputations 
as leading philanthropists of peace and refused to cooperate in establish-
ing their peace funds. In addition, Ginn, believing the peace movement 
should strive toward business efficiency, often disagreed with the directors 
of his own World Peace Foundation who through speeches and writings 
were more interested in uplifting their audiences to their high-minded 
aims.14 
But all these differences paled in comparison with the fundamentally 
divergent views between the pacific-minded and the leaders of the 
Carnegie Endowment. The latter strongly disapproved of the emotional 
and "radical" tendencies of the peace societies. Unlike the peace societies 
and the World Peace Foundation, which actively disseminated their 
message of pacific internationalism to literate Americans, the Carnegie 
trustees promoted almost entirely the extremely cautious goal of inter-
national understanding among a small group of scholars and inter-
national lawyers. Compared with the Endowment's financial support of 
international law and other non-pacifist groups, its subsidy to the peace 
societies amounted to a mere pittance, and by 1913 several Carnegie 
trustees began to suggest the curtailment of the Endowment's subvention 
unless the societies abandoned their pacifistic emphasis.15 
I l l 
The many views and temperaments in the peace movement fore-
shadowed the divergent responses to the world crisis after 1914, but be-
fore that date a tenuous consensus existed among the peace forces. In-
deed, a dominant note of the American peace movement before 1914 was 
the relative absence of overt controversy. The advocates of peace fre-
quently appeared on the same platform at peace congresses and rarely 
engaged in extensive debate over their different viewpoints. When they 
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recognized their differences, they usually assumed that they were more 
complementary than conflicting. Especially absent was severe public 
criticism of their colleagues. Edwin Mead, a vigorous anti-preparedness 
advocate, even convinced himself that it was "ridiculous" to believe that 
the Carnegie trustees did not advocate the reduction of armaments al-
though some of them were prominent supporters of the Navy League, 
and the leaders of the New York Peace Society deliberately attempted to 
minimize differences of opinion in the movement.16 
There are a few obvious explanations for this failure to emphasize 
their real differences. Perhaps most important, during these years of 
relative peace and isolation the pressures for defining and defending one's 
position on the peace question were minimal. Moreover, there existed 
a few areas of general agreement which helped to maintain an uneasy 
unity in the movement. First, all endorsed periodic international con-
gresses for the discussion of questions of common interest. Second, they 
all assumed that the United States as a satiated and relatively secure 
power should take the lead in advancing specific proposals leading to a 
more harmonious international order. Third, although only the legalists 
were very precise in their definitions of international law, all conceded 
the importance of the development of ''law" in establishing nations' 
rights and duties in the world community. Finally, none opposed the 
establishment of a court of arbitral justice as the next, most practical 
step toward instituting a new world order following the Second Hague 
Peace Conference's endorsement in principle of this institution.17 
But there were also other, often deeper reasons for their cooperative 
behavior. One was their similar backgrounds. The social origins of al-
most all the thirty-six peace leaders were so remarkably alike that it was 
easier for them to tolerate different approaches to world peace than if 
their backgrounds had been more diverse. Despite their wide age-span 
and different lengths of service in the movement, from every other 
sociological perspective their social origins were virtually identical.18 
All but six—Bartholclt, Carnegie, Love, Lucia Ames Mead, Hannah 
Bailey (head of the peace department of the W.C.T.U.), and James Slay-
den (Democratic congressman from Texas)—had received college de-
grees, and nearly two-thirds also had earned professional certification in 
their chosen fields of law, education or religion. Since only relatively 
affluent families could usually afford to send their children to college in 
that day, these figures, together with other information on their parents' 
social standing, indicate that almost all the peace workers came from the 
middle or upper classes and, upon reaching maturity, formed an edu-
cated elite among the professional classes.19 
These similarities went beyond their social class, however. Only the 
Chicago Unitarian minister, Jenkin Lloyd Jones, Fannie Fern Andrews, 
Carnegie, Scott and Bartholclt were foreign-born, and of these only 
Bartholclt came from a non-English speaking nation or migrated to the 
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United States after early childhood. Of the native Americans all but 
Hull, Slayden, Short and Theodore Marburg were born east of the 
Mississippi and north of the Mason-Dixon line. Moreover, although 
many were reared in small towns, they early moved to large cities whose 
cultural and intellectual advantages seemed inevitably to attract men 
and women of education and intellect; and by 1909 nearly three-fourths 
of the peace workers lived in six metropolitan areas—Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C. and Chicago.20 In addition, 
all were Protestants and about one-half came from strongly religious 
households, thought seriously of the ministry as a career or were or-
dained clergymen.21 
In sum, the social characteristics of the thirty-six peace leaders were 
overwhelmingly urban, professional, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. In 
many instances, in fact, the sociological ties were more than casual. 
Among the New York peace workers Frederick Lynch had been a class-
mate of Hamilton Holt at Yale and of William Short at Yale Theological 
School. Lynch married one of Samuel Dutton's daughters and intro-
duced Short to his future wife.22 George Kirchwey and Dutton also had 
received degrees from Yale and, together with James Brown Scott and 
Nicholas Murray Butler, became professors or administrators at Colum-
bia University. All of these peace workers figured prominently in the 
formation and programs of the New York Peace Society or the Carnegie 
Endowment. The same close ties existed among Boston peace workers. 
Before moving to New York, Dutton was a school administrator in the 
Boston area and frequently discussed educational problems in a Boston 
reform organization, the Twentieth Century Club. His exposure to 
many Boston friends of peace in this group first introduced him to the 
peace movement. Furthermore, Lynch's and Call's early contacts with 
other Boston advocates of peace helped to foster their growing interest 
in the cause.23 
IV 
But of more far-reaching importance than their social backgrounds, 
though in large measure derived from them, were the common attitudes 
and values the peace workers expressed in the movement. Most im-
portant, their approach to the peace movement was distinctly elitist. 
The political conservatives in the movement deliberately discouraged 
participation by the lower classes, but even more progressive elements 
gave little emphasis to them. With a few exceptions, most notably Jane 
Addams and William Jennings Bryan, they assumed that literate gentle-
men of the middle and upper classes could more easily understand and 
identify with the civilized quality of their movement than the unen-
lightened masses. Not surprisingly, they relied upon their contacts with 
friends in governmental circles for their influence and shunned involve-
ment in politics and contacts with immigrant, moderate socialist or 
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labor groups. The high-priced dinners and formal receptions of the New 
York Peace Society and the Carnegie Endowment, Albert Smiley's hand-
picked conferences at Lake Mohonk, and the leadership of peace societies 
limited to educators, ministers and philanthropists exemplified this same 
elitism.24 
In most instances, theirs was not deliberate snobbery. Rather, re-
flecting the Mugwump traditions and teachings which were common 
among many reformers of that era, they assumed that the man in the 
street was an important factor in public opinion only to the extent of 
his ability to absorb their own ideas. Until education could enlighten 
the general public, these leaders assumed that they alone were the proper 
custodians of the peace movement. Even progressive reformers like 
Lynch, Lochner, and David Starr Jordan, while expressing greater faith 
in the populace, upheld the Mugwump emphasis on enlightened leader-
ship and agreed that international reform would have to come from above 
rather than from below. Lynch, for example, assumed that ''It is the 
prophets and leaders who make the changes of the world. The talk of 
vox populi is often more of a delusion than a reality." While they 
regularly expounded their views on the peace question to formal gather-
ings, they rarely engaged their audiences in public discussion or attempted 
to include them in the daily operations of the peace movement. Indeed, 
fascinated by great leaders of the past and present, they easily tolerated 
the growing involvement in the movement of influential conservatives 
whose participation seemed to confirm the dignity of their own peace 
work.25 In consequence, the peace movement increasingly acquired an 
aura of gentility and respectability but at the expense of widening the 
gap between the peace leaders and the masses. 
The peace leaders managed to maintain an uneasy consensus on 
other values. Above all, they shared an unquestioning belief in the 
reality of moral values. The acceptance of moral values as the main-
spring of human behavior was deeply ingrained in the American char-
acter, as the Puritans, transcendentalists and anti-slavery reformers had 
earlier demonstrated; and the most pacifistic internationalists frequently 
referred to the humanistic values of their forebears. They also derived 
added inspiration for their ethical values from Christian humanists and 
Enlightenment philosophers throughout the Western world. Unlike 
American ultranationalists, who had little faith in the pervasiveness of 
ethical principles beyond the water's edge, these pacific-minded indi-
viduals optimistically believed that these values existed universally and 
already exerted a far-reaching influence on the foreign policies of nation 
states.26 Other international reformers were less sanguine. They agreed 
that the acceptance of moral values was widespread, but they assumed 
that they were most obviously present in their own land and to a lesser 
degree in other so-called civilized or Christian nations.27 
In the long run, the distinction between the pacifists' humanism and 
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the other peace workers' more limited emphasis on civilized nations was 
crucial. The latter, more readily believing in the essential virtue of 
American conduct in foreign affairs, could more easily justify their na-
tion's forceful intervention in the affairs of other states for the sake of 
reforming their policies along American or ''civilized" lines than those 
inclining toward pacifism, who were profoundly skeptical about the use 
of force in foreign affairs. During peacetime, however, this distinction 
caused no difficulties. 
If the peace leaders had believed only in the reality of moral values 
in international life, they would have had difficulty in explaining why 
nations had resorted to wars throughout history. But they were not 
Pollyannas. Admitting that man was not inherently good and might 
even be instinctively pugnacious, many peace workers tempered their 
optimism with warnings about his combative instincts. James Slayden 
lamented that ''the spirit of the people is inclined toward war," and 
Holt agreed that "the great mass of men and women almost prefer war 
to peace."28 Yet they stopped far short of the conclusion that mankind 
was therefore inevitably doomed to recurrent wars. Rather, international 
cooperation was still possible and worth the quest. In general, they ad-
vanced four explanations for resolving the apparent contradiction be-
tween their awareness of the persistence of international tensions and 
their continuing hopes for a peaceful world order. 
First, the pacific-minded and a few other internationalists often 
blamed wars on a tiny minority of munitions makers and military men 
who, motivated by greed and glory, cleverly fabricated war scares and 
promoted wars.29 Second, peace workers emphasized moral education. 
Assuming the individual had a moral sense and a capacity for reason, 
they stressed education as vitally important in developing these qualities. 
Proper education, they believed, could overcome man's ignorance, the 
major reason for his deviation from moral rectitude. Despite different 
emphases in educational philosophy, all asserted the primacy of the edu-
cator's moral function.30 Third, they all believed that permanent in-
ternational machinery would restrain man's passions and thereby reduce 
the chances for war. Once nations established arbitral tribunals, com-
missions of inquiry and especially a world court, then international con-
troversies could be removed from the potentially wrathful populace and 
placed in the hands of cool-headed, impartial administrators. While 
promoting international agreements requiring submission of almost all 
kinds of controversies to the appropriate agency, in practice they ac-
cepted almost any agreement as a positive step in the long-range goal of 
world organization.31 
An imposing obstacle to the implementation of permanent interna-
tional institutions, however, was the reluctance of governments to re-
linquish their freedom of action to international agencies. Many peace 
advocates, especially the legalists, seemed to understand the practical 
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difficulties, but on the whole the peace workers minimized them. Re-
flecting their faith in enlightened leadership, they believed that a few 
statesmen understood the advantages of such agencies and could establish 
them without waiting for the education and conversion of world public 
opinion. The negotiation of many arbitration and conciliation treaties 
as well as the nations' acceptance in principle of a court of arbitral 
justice seemed to suggest that many statesmen were already interested in 
developing peacekeeping machinery. 
They further argued that there was no need to invent institutional 
arrangements, for the American Constitution provided the perfect model 
for world organization. Accepting unquestioningly the superiority of 
the American federal system, many peace advocates naively assumed it 
could function effectively on an international scale. Minimizing the 
differences between the cultural and political harmony of the American 
experience and the anarchistic condition of world politics, these advo-
cates of peace extended the analogy of the American judiciary, legislature 
and executive to the international sphere.32 The international reformers' 
confidence in American political institutions further underscored the 
limits of their internationalism. While thinking they were internation-
alists, their faith in the unique blessings of the American experience 
indicated a distinct though often unconscious nationalist loyalty as well. 
Instead of advancing a reasoned and full-scale critique of the excessive 
nationalism of their day, almost all peace workers assumed that national 
rivalries would be a reality until foreign leaders came to adopt American 
values and institutions. In this way peace workers held out vague hopes 
for world peace in the future without risking much, if any, of their 
present prestige or respectability. 
The peace workers foresaw no difficulties in looking to the future for 
vindication of their movement because, fourth and most commonly, they 
always linked morality to progress. They assumed that progress was a 
natural force operating automatically in human affairs. While they 
differed in the emphasis they gave to the desirability and direction of 
progressive currents, they all shared this faith in moral progress. Those 
inclining toward pacifism believed that moral progress was at work 
throughout the world. As evidence of this advance, they often cited the 
decline of major wars among Western nations in the modern era.33 
Others, more restrained and less humanistic, stressed the slow, steady 
enlightenment of the great powers. Marburg, for instance, believed that 
only the Western nations were agents of progress. Butler was more 
vague but emphasized that the movement toward the organization of the 
world was as "sure as that of an Alpine glacier."34 
The peace workers also explained progress in material terms. As the 
movement acquired a "practical" outlook, the pacifists' attacks on war 
as murderous and therefore immoral declined, while they increasingly 
joined with their friends in the peace movement in opposing war because 
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it was destructive of material comforts and generally wasteful. They 
also agreed with them in deploring the high costs of war preparations, 
which burdened the populace with taxes and restricted the funds avail-
able for programs of human betterment. Yet they refused to accept 
militarism as a growing evil of modern life. Rather, they regarded it as 
an anachronistic survival of an earlier, unenlightened era and as incom-
patible with modern industrialism.35 Citing the enormous productivity 
unleashed by the industrial revolution and the resulting expansion of 
international trade, they viewed these developments as essentially bénéf-
icient. Commercial intercourse brought the business interests closer 
together, hastened the development of international amity and facilitated 
the movement toward the federation of the world.36 It was no accident 
that businessmen began to flock to peace meetings in these years, for they 
fully shared both the peace leaders' elitism and their faith in material 
progress. They warmly praised arbitration treaties as tangible mani-
festations of the rational, businesslike approach to international rela-
tions, and they characterized war as harmful to the material prosperity of 
all nations.37 
With such a sturdy faith in moral and material progress it was in-
evitable that the longer world peace prevailed the stronger were the 
peace workers' convictions that the day of permanent peace was within 
their grasp. Superficial signs of progress toward their goal, especially 
the proliferation of international conferences and arbitration treaties, 
the conversion of Presidents Taft and Wilson to their high-minded aims, 
the reaction against the large-navy forces in Congress and the growing 
acceptance of the peace movement among the educated classes nourished 
their confidence in the future of the movement. The desire for "peace" 
became so infectious that even the leading boosters of the Navy League 
felt it advisable to proclaim their strong opposition to war.38 Susceptible 
to words and gestures which provided more than a glimmer of hope for 
the future, a few peace leaders looked forward to the day when their 
movement would achieve victory.39 
Actually, most peace workers did not think in terms of the imminent 
millenium, for they had frequently traveled in Europe and regularly 
corresponded with their trans-Atlantic counterparts on the European 
situation, and realized that the recurrent European crises had increased 
the existing tensions between the rival alliance systems to the point 
where a future clash between them might quickly precipitate a general 
war. They also recognized that the Balkan wars had led to a resurgence 
of the military spirit and war propaganda throughout Europe.40 But if 
these peace leaders understood the immediate dangers to the European 
peace, only Trueblood predicted the likelihood of a major war. All the 
other advocates of peace, perhaps unconsciously unwilling to question 
their faith in inevitable progress, repressed their deeper fears about the 
European situation.41 
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The aftermath of Sarajevo seriously tested the superficial unity of the 
entire movement. For some of those most emotionally committed to the 
cause, the shock of war was traumatic. Carnegie, Trueblood and Edwin 
Mead fell seriously ill in 1915 and there is evidence that their illnesses 
were as much psychosomatic as physical in origin.42 Not all the peace 
workers suffered so unhappily, although the World War undermined 
their most optimistic assumptions about world politics and forced a 
painful reassessment of their approaches to peace questions. 
V 
The American peace movement did not entirely collapse after 1914, 
but the pressures of the war brought to the surface its internal weak-
nesses. The failure of the peace workers was not their inability to pre-
vent the European bloodbath which was beyond their control. They 
failed in the first place because of their optimistic and rather shallow 
assumptions about world politics. Surely they placed too much faith 
in the rationality of man, were too confident in their reliance on moral 
education, overestimated the applicability of American values and 
institutions and underestimated the importance of national self-interest 
and power in international relations. Moreover, in emphasizing inevita-
ble progress, the peace workers tolerated the status quo in international 
life while still holding out hope for a gradual evolution toward a peace-
ful world order. Such talk tended to gloss over the real and menacing 
international problems of their day. In particular, while disliking exces-
sive nationalism, they advanced neither trenchant nor persistent critiques 
of it. Even the few criticisms of the military and armament interests 
failed to probe deeply into the virulent imperial and national rivalries 
which fostered the armament race. Moreover, if all the peace advocates 
disagreed with the ultranationaliste emphasis on national power and 
prestige as the legitimate ends of foreign policy, they expressed a sense 
of mission which they could invoke to justify the forceful application of 
American ideals of peace, freedom and justice on an aberrant Europe. 
As the pressures for American involvement in the European conflict in-
creased, only the most pacific-minded consistently resisted the tempta-
tion to approve military intervention as a prerequisite for obtaining an 
American version of international order. 
It is important, however, to place the failure of the peace advocates 
in proper historical perspective. One should remember that they lived 
in an age far removed from the intense ideological conflicts and cata-
clysmic wars of post-1914 generations. Theirs was a confident era when 
all kinds of reform really seemed possible. Given this hopeful atmosphere 
in American domestic life and Americans' inexperience in world affairs, 
it is understandable why the peace leaders often made strained analogies 
between American values and institutions and international reform. 
Moreover, the peace advocates were not dismissed as eccentrics by the 
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American public but represented part of a larger cultural elite which 
assumed moral progress and which thought in abstract, if not idealistic 
terms. If one insists upon the validity of moral judgments in history, 
then it is better to view the peace movement within the broader context 
of the inadequacies of that entire culture.43 
The elitist assumptions which the peace leaders shared with other 
leaders in America also account for the weaknesses of the pre-war peace 
movement. Although most of the earliest leaders consistently expressed 
a concern for human values, they reflected to a lesser extent the conscious 
elitism of many of the later recruits. In consequence, despite its growth 
the pre-war peace movement never developed meaningful contacts with 
movements for social and political change. Its rhetoric reflected this 
elitism. While it was always lofty in tone, it became less warmly human-
istic and more coldly intellectual. Its idealistic message could arouse the 
interest of high-minded individuals in the peace movement, but because 
it expressed no urgent social message it could not sustain the active in-
volvement of a reform-minded generation in the cause. 
Even if the peace workers had surmounted their class biases, it is 
doubtful whether they would have aroused much more public commit-
ment to the cause before 1914. During a time of peace and isolation as 
well as of a predominant interest in domestic reform, it would have been 
difficult to win over large numbers of people to the peace movement. 
Given the paucity of public commitment to their programs, perhaps they 
were wise in accepting the reality of the nation state and in cultivating 
the educated elite and political leaders to their long-range goal of a 
peaceful world order. A unified and concerted effort among peace leaders 
might have converted American and perhaps European statesmen to a 
workable formula for world order. 
But they could not agree on a formula. Beyond a tenuous agreement 
on general values and a common desire for world peace, they differed 
fundamentally on the specific details for the realization of their goal. 
The pacific-minded, federationists and legalists disagreed on the proper 
means to the idealistic end. As long as relative peace lasted, they were 
able to minimize their differences. But the World War intensified in-
terest in international institutions and soon compelled the peace leaders 
to define more explicitly their peace proposals for the post-war world. 
The war especially necessitated a thorough discussion of the thorny ques-
tion of sanctions in any authoritative international body. The world 
federationists endorsed the use of force against nations which refused to 
submit their international disputes to arbitration or conciliation; but the 
legalists insisted upon adequate rules of law, a world court and a general 
agreement among nations on the specific powers of the court as pre-
requisites to any forceful sanctions; and some inclining toward pacifism 
opposed all sanctions.44 
When the peace advocates began to realize their divergent views after 
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1914, they gradually reorganized their movement into several autonomous 
organizations, each of which more clearly denned its priorities and pro-
grams. While these new groups helped to encourage President Wilson's 
growing interest in the principles for a new international order after the 
war, none had sufficient influence to convert him to a specific formula. 
Perhaps aware of the lack of harmony on the details of world organiza-
tion, Wilson felt little compulsion to adopt any one of their plans. At 
the same time it is not surprising that Wilson's proposals for an inter-
national organization should fail to receive the undivided support of 
peace workers once they began to consider the specific features of the 
proposed League of Nations.45 
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